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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider a(potentially) incomplete financial ma.rkets economy where
the trade of assets is constrained by two different types of constraints. The first type
will be called portfolio conetrainta. These are constraints on the portfolio holdings of
the agents. Several examples of models with constraints on portfolio holdings can be
found in the literature. In [Balasko, Cass, Siconolfi (1990)] the authors consider an
incomplete markets model with real asset structure where each agent has a portfolio
choice set. This is the set of portfolios that the agent is allowed to purchase. In
their paper, these portfolio choice sets are considered to be lineaz subspaces. Another
exa.mple is [Younès (1988)]. Here, the author defines the concept of a auómarket, which
is a market where only a certain number of consumption bundlea can be traded against
each other. Agents have restricted access to these submarkets. The access is again
defined by linear sttbspaces. In [Siconolfi (1989)] existence of eqtulibria for incomplete
financial markets with nominal asset structure is establiahed under the presence of fairly
general portfolio choice sets.
The second type of constraints we consider in our model are traneaction costs. As
opposed to models where transaction costs are real inputs and inte.rmediaries are mo-
deled as profit maximizers over their transaction set (see for instance [Hahn (1973)] or
[Starrett (1973)]), we consider the case where intermediaries get a commission for their
intermecliation. This commission depends on the priees of the assets and the traded
quantities of each of the assets. The brokerage houses aze owned by the agents, so in
the end, the broker's profit returns to the agents.
The assets in our model are considered to be nominal with exogenous yield, i.e. as-
sets pay off in units of account, and the payoff does not depend on spot prices. It
is well known that, in the absence of transaction costs or portfolio constraints, equi-
libria exist on potentially incomplete financial markets with nominal assets (see for
instance [Werner (1985)]). So, as opposed to other approaches ([Préchac (1993)]), we
don't introcíuce transaction costs in order to prove that they can eliminate problems of
nonexistence of equilibria, Uecause there are no such problems in the case of nominal
assets. We introduce portfolio constraints as well as transaction costs because very often
thc tracli~ of a5sotti is constr.uncd by it~stitntional rules, .uid by thc fact that thcrc is an
intermcdiary penon who gets a certain percentage of the price paid Uy the buyer. Tlus
situation typically occurs for instance in insurance markets. Insurance contracts are
very often traded tluough insurance bmkers, who get a certain percentage of the price
of the contract. On the other hand, the trade of insurance contracts is constrained by
institutional rules such as the prohibition ofoverinsurance. So both types of constraints
are presc~nt on some markets. Therefore, it seems interesting to study the effects of such
constraints on the trade.2
The aiin in this paper is to show that eqiulibria exist on financial markets with
two types of trading constraints, namely portfolio constraints and transaction costs.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between two types of arbitrage possibilities,
those that can yield an infinite profit for at least one agent (type one) and those that
can "only" yield a finite profit for all agents (type two). Arbitrage possibilities of
type two occur when there exists a portfolio z wluch yields a non-negative payoff in
each state, strictly positive in at least one state, and has a negative price, such that
there exists an n E IN such that tz cannot be traded (as a result of the portfolio
constraints) as soon as t~ n. Clearly, type two azbitrage possibilities are not necessazily
incompatible with utility maximization. This implies that equilibrium prices aze no
longer a priori no-azbitrage prices. By giving an example of an incomplete mazket
with portfolio constraints where an equilibrium price for a nominal asset with positive
payoff is strictly negative, we show that type two arbitrage possibilities are indeed not
necessarily incompatible with equilibrium. Only the first type of azbitrage possibilities is
incompatible with equilibrium. This shows that the presence of portfolio constraints can
have an important influence on the structure of the equilibrium prices. The underlying
rea.son is that, as a result of these constraints, even wider the presence of arbitrage
possibilities of type two, budget sets remain compact, and therefore agents are still able
to maximize their utility over their budget set.
As mentioned before, the transaction costs are chazacterized by a function depending
on the prices of the J assets, and the quantities bought or sold of each of the J assets.
The portfolio constraints are chazacterized by a collection of subsets of IR~, called trade
sets. So each agent has a trade set, which is the set of portfolios that the agent is allowed
to purchase. These portfolio constraints are asymmetric in the sense that these trade
sets don't have to be the same for each agent. For example in insurance markets, the
pmhibition of overinsurance implies that each agent has a portfolio set which consists
of those insurance portfolios that the agent can trade without getting overinsured. This
of course depends upon his initial risk position. So, vaguely stated, agents who baze
"more risk" will be allowed to buy "more~ insurance contracts than those who bare
"less risk".
We proceed in the following way : in section 2, we define the model and we give an
example. In section 3, we define the equilibrium concept. In section 4, we study the
properties of demand and excess demand correspondences. This includes the definition
of the set of asset prices for which type one azbitrage possibilities do not exist. In section
5, we prove existence of equilibria. Section 6 concludes.3
2. The market model
We consider an economy where L physical goods are available. There are two periods,
which we will call date zero and date one. At date one, the world can be in S different
states, indexed by s E{1, 2, ..., S}. Date zero will be denoted state zero. Each of the
L goods can be traded at each of the S f 1 spot markets, one at date zero and one for
each possible state of the world at date one.
We will denote p, -(ps,t , P,,z, ---, P.,[.) for the row vector containing the spot prices
of each of the L goods in state s. So for each state s E{0,1, . .., S}, we have p, E IRL.
The consumption set X' of agent i E{1, 2, ... , I} equals
IR~x(sft)
So consumption
bundles are matrices in IR~x(Stt~. We will denote x- x x xs) for a consumption t ( o, t,...
bundle where, for each state s E{0,1, .. ., S}, x, -(x,,t , x.,s, -.., x,,L )~ is the column
vector containing the amotmt of each of the L goods if the world is in state s. Each
agent has an initial endowment vector w' -(wó, w„ ..., ws). So for each agent i E
{ 1, 2, ..., I} and for every state s E{0,1, ..., S}, w; -(w; t, w; 2i ..., w; ~)t is the
column vector containing the amount of each of the L goods owned by the agent before
any trade took place if the mazket is in state s. For each spot price matrix p E IR(sft)x[,
and for each consumption bundle x E jj;Gx(sft) we will denote (px)1 for the column
vector x pyxz,...,psxs) . (Pt ~, ~
Each agent has a preference relation ~'C X' x X' to express his preferences between
different consumption btmdles x, y E X'.
Agents will trade on spot markets as well as on asset markets in order to maximize
their utility. There are J financial assets which pay off at date one. Assets are considered
to be nominal, i.e. they pay off in units of account. The payoff of the assets does not
depend on spot prices, it only depends on the state of the world at date one. We
will denote A~ -(At~, A2„ . .., As~ )~ E IRs for vector containing the payoff of asset
j in each of the S states of the world at date one. We denote A for the matrix in
~sx ~ v,ith jis column eqttal to A~ for j E{1, 2, . .., J}. Portfolios will be denoted
t J z - (zt,zz,.. ,zJ) E IR .
The portfolio constraints are expressed by the fact that each agent has a trade eet
Z' C IR~. The interpretation is that agent i is only allowed to purchase portfolios
zEZ'.
For each asset j E{ 1, 2, ..., J}, the price of the asset (in units of account) will be
denoted g~. We will denote q for the row vector (qt , qz, ..., q~) E IR~. Prices have to
be paid at date zero.
Since there are transaction costs, and transaction costs have to be paid for buying
assets as well as for selling assets, it is convenient to define for each vector z E IRJ, the4
vector ~z~ E IR~ as follows :
Izl - (Iz~l,lzzl,...,lz~l)`.
In the sequel, we will assume that the transactiou cost for buying or selling zi units of
asset j equals a certain percentage of ~9i~~zi~. So the transaction cost for purchasing a
portfolio z E IRJ through the intermediation of a certain broker, given that the prices
of the assets aze given by the vector q E IR~, is equal to
~
c~4~~z~ - c~ ~9i~~zi~,
ivi
where c E[0,1[ is exogenous. Therefore, the total cost of a portfolio z equals qz-I-c~q~~z~.
We take the absolute value of q and of z in the definition of the transaction costs because
transaction costs have to be positive, whatever the sign ofthe prices qi, j E{1, 2, . .., J}.
Flirthermore, transaction costs have to be paíci for buying assets (zi ~ 0) as well as for
selling assets (z~ c 0). R.emazk that for positive asset prices q 1 0, this definition of
the transaction costs is the same as in [Préchac (1993)]. -
These transaction costs aze paid to an intermediary person, called the broker. The
profit of the broker will be denoted n. We assiune that the brokerage house is owned
by the agents. The fraction of the brokerage house owned by agent i, i.e. the share of
agent i in the profits of the brokerage house, will be denoted v; E[0,1]. Flu~thermore,
i
~.-i v~ - 1.
In order to simplify notations, we will assume that there is only one broker on the
mazket. In case of more brokers (with different percentages c) the results still hold. The
reason why we present them in the case of one broker is because with more brokers, say
n~ 1, instead of having one portfolio per agent, we would need n portfolios per agent
(one for each broker), in order to be able to detennine transaction costs. Therefore,
notations get more complex.
Furthermore, it can be seen easily that all the results in this paper remain valid if
we consider the case where there are several "classes" of assets on the market and each
class has a different commission c. An example of such a market would be a market
where part of the assets are financial assets and the other ones are insurance contracts.
Then it seems reasonable to assume that there are different commissions c for those two
types of assets. In the remainder of this section, we will treat this example in detail.
Examples : 1) Consider a market where part of the agents are insurers, indexed by
i E Z C{ 1, 2, ..., I}. There is a fixed number of insurance contracts on the market,
say R, each corresponding to a risk bared by at lesst one agent i E{1, 2, . .., I}. There
is also a munber of financial assets K on the market. I.et A denote the matrix in5
~sx~xtR) where the first K columns denote the payoff of the financial assets, and the
last R columns denote the payoff of the insurance contracts. We assume in this example
that the only portfolio constraints are the prohibition of overinsurance and the fact that
agents who are not insurers (i ~ Z) are not allowed to sell insurance contracts. Then
the trade sets would be :
R
Z' - IfiK X~] - oo, c'~],
for insurers i E Z, and
R
Z' - IRK X ~[O,C~],
j-]
for agents who arc not insurera (i ~ Z). In both cases c~ deuotes the fraction of thc
corresponding risk j bazed by the agent. So z~ G c~ implies that the agent is not allowed
to get overinsured on that risk. For insurers, z~ E] - oo, c'~] implies that they can sell
insurance contracts for risk j without constraints, and they can get reinsured on risk j
but they cannot get "over-reinsured". For agents i~ Z, 0 G z~ G c'~ implies that the
agent is not allowed to sell the insttrance contract, and is not allowed to get overinsttred
on that risk.
Furthermore, there is a broker who is an intermediate between the seller of an insur-
ance contract (the insurance agents i E Z) and the buyer of the contract. He receives
a commission of cr100~o of the price of the insttred risk. On the other hand, there is a
broker who is an intennediate between the seller aaid the buyer of financial assets. He
receives a commission of ca 100010 of the price of the asset. So, if the prices of the assets
aze given by qa E IRK, and the prices of the insurance contracts are given by qr E 1RL,
the total cost of a portfolio (za, zr) E Z' wottld be :
9aZa f 9rzr f Ca~4a~~~a~ f Cr~4r~~zr~.
The effects of the trading constraints Z', i E{1, 2, ..., I} on such a mixed financial-
(re)insurance market aze studied in detail in [De Waegenaere (1994)].
2) If we take Z' - IRf for all agents i E { 1, 2, ..., I}, then we get an incomplete mar-
kets model for nominal assets with transaction costs but without portfolio constraints.
Equivalently, if we take c- 0, then we get azt incoinplete markets model for nominal
assets with portfolio constraints but without transaction costs. Finally, the incomplete
markets model as in [Werner (1985)] is a special case of our model if we take c- 0 and
Z' - IRJ,i E {1,2,...,I}.6
3. Equilibria on financial markets
We can now define the budget set of an agent, i.e. the set of vectora, consisting of
a consumption bundle and a portfolio of assets that the agent can obtain as a result
of an allowed trade, taking into account the portfolio constraints, transaction costs
and the broker's profit. From now on, we will assume that initial endowment vectors
wi, i E{1, 2, ..., I}, as well as shares v;, i E{ 1, 2, .. ., I}, are given exogenously.
Deflnition 3.1 : The budget set of agent i E {1,2,...,I} for given spot prices
p E IRlsfi)XL, asset prices q E IR~, and óroker's profit ~r E 1R is given by :
, f , ~
B(P, 4, ~r) - (z, z) E X x Z Pozo C Powó - 4z~- c~q~~z~ f v;~r
l (Pi)i - (Pw )i f Az
It might seem aztificial to introduce the budget sets of the agents with an inequality
in the date zero constraint, and an equality in the date one coustraiuts. We put an
inequality at date zero in order to get a convex budget set (the absolute value of z
causes non convexity in the case of an equality). For technical reasons (see for instance
lemma 4.1), we introduce equalities for the date one constraints. Of course it is cleaz
that, under strict monotonicity of the preferences, both constraints will be equalities at
equilibritun. Therefore, we can define budget sets as in definition 3.1 without loss of
generality.
Each agent will try to maximize his utility over his budget set. Therefore, a financial
mazket equilibrium is defined as follows :
Deflnition 3.2 : A financial market equilibrium is a vector of consumption bundles
{á',i E{1,2,...,I}}, asset portfolios {z',i E {1,2,...,I}}, spot prices p E ]R~sfi)x[,
asset prices q E 11f~, and óroker's profit ~r E 11Z satisfying :
for all i E{1, 2, ..., I} :
i~ there does not ezist (y, v) E B'(p, q, ~r) such that y~` x,
ii~ (z, z) E B'(p, q, ~r)
and :
~ i ~ i iii~ ~i-i z - ~i-i w ,
I ~; iv) ~i-~ z - 0,
v~ n- c~~i ~9~~z ~.
Conditions i) to iv) are the usual conditious for utility maximization and market
clearing on financial markets. Condition v) expresses that the broker's profit equals the
total amount of transaction costs paid by all the agents. It is clear that, if preference7
relations are strictly monotone, we can apply Walras' law. Therefore, if iv) is satisfied,
S f 1 of the (S -~ 1)L f 1 market clearing conditions in iii) and v) are redundant,
one for each state s E{0,1, ..., S}. For instance, since the sum of all shares equals 1,
i.e. ~~ i~; - 1, it is clear that i) --~ iv) imply v). Therefore, condition v) is in fact ~-i
redundant.
As stated before, the aim in this paper is to prove existence of equilibria on a(po-
tentially) incomplete financial market with portfolio constraints as well as transaction
costs. Therefore, we need to study the properties of the demand and excess demand
correspondences. Before we do so, we introduce sorne assumptions and notations.
Notations : For a subset Z C IR" for some n 1 1, we will denote Z for the closure,
8Z for the botmdary, int(Z) for the interior of the set Z, and Z` for its complement,
i.e. Z` - ~" `Z.
For a matrix A E j[~nXm' we will denote Ker(A) for the null space of the matrix, i.e.
Ker(A) -{z E IR"` ~ Az - 0}.
For a vector q E IRJ, and an e 1 0, we will denote B(q, e) for the open ball with center
q and radius e.
Furthermore, for a spot price vector p E]({(sfi)xG an~~t price vector q E IRJ, a
consumption bundle x E][~tx(sti) and a trade vector z E IRJ, we will denote
S J
(P, 9)(x, z) - ~ Pa2a f~ qjzj.
e-0 j-1
We will denote AS(i) for the asymptotic cone of the trade set of agent i, i.e.
AS(i)-{zEZ' ~tzEZ`foralltE~}.
Finally, we denote 1~ for the ji~ unit colunm vector in IR". If n is clear from the
context, we will omit it in the notation.
Assumptions A :
A1) preference relations ~`,i E{ 1, 2, ..., I} are continuous, strictly monotone and
convex,
AZ ) ia' ~ 1 0 for each agent í E{ 1, 2, ..., I},
A3) the trade sets Z',í E{1,2,...,I} satisfy
A3~ ) Z' is closed and convex,
A32) 0 E Z',8
A33) for each asset j E{ 1, 2, ..., J}, there exists an e 1 0 and agents il, iZ E
{1, 2, ..., I} such that el~ E Z'' and -el~ E Z",
Ag) Ker(A) fl AS(i) -{0} for all i E{1,2,...,I}.
Remarks :
1) It is clear (srr for iustatice [Debreu (1959)]) that wtdcr asstuuptiou Ai, there exist
utility functions u' : X' -i IRt, i E{ 1, 2, ..., I}, such that x ~' y q u'(x) 1 u`(y).
Now for a set B C Iftt}~)L x 1R~, we will denote
argmaxu'(x) :- {(x,z) E B ~ there does not exist (y,v) E B: y Y' x}.
(x,z)EB
2) Under assumptions A31 and A32i the definition of the asymptotic cone AS(i) is
equivalent to the definition of the asymptotic cone of a set as it is given in [Debreu
(1959)].
3) Assumption A4 weakens the assumption of no redundancy (Ker(A) -{0}).
4. Demand and excess demand
As usual, the demand and excess demand correspondences are defined as follows :
Deflnition 4.1 : For each agent i E{ 1, 2, . .., I}, we define
Ï~(P, 9, x) - argmax u`(x)
(y~s)EB'(D~9~~)
-{(x,z) E B'(p,q,~r) ~ there is no (y,v) E B'(p,q,n) : y r' x}.
The exceea demand relation is defined by :
I
F(P, 4, ~) - ~(.f'(P, 4, ~) - (w~, ~)).
;-i
In this section, we study the properties of these demand and excess demand rela-
tions. As in the case of incomplete financial inarkets without portfolio constraints or
transaction costs, we stazt by defining the set of asset prices and spot prices for which
budget sets are compact. It is clear that this will still be closely related to the non
existence of azbitrage opportunities. It is important however to remark that, under the
presence of trade sets Z', i E{1, 2, ..., I}, one has to make a difference between two
kinds of arbitrage possibilities, those that can yield an infïnite pro8t for at least one
agent (type one), and those that can only yield a finite profit for each agent (because of9
their portfolio constraints) (type two). Consider for instance the case where a certain
agent has a compact trade set Z`. Then it is clear that his budget set will be compact
whatever the prices of the assets may be. Indeed, since his trade set is botmded, the
~~rofit of arbitrage possibilities within his trade set will also be bounded. So it becomes
clear that, in order to have compact budget sets, one only has to exclude those arbitrage
possibilities that can yield an infinite profit, i.e. those price vectors for which there ex-
itits a hortfolio in the asymptotic cone of the trade set of at least one agent, yielding
a uon-ucgative return in each state and a strictly positive return in at least one state.
Therefore, we have the following definition :
Deflnition 4.2 :We define the set of no arbitrage asset prices as follows :
Q--S4E~J b'z E U;-tAS(i) : (-9z ÁzI4IIz~1 ~ ~}tt `{0} } .
Since spot prices have to be positive, we deftne the práce set P as follows
P :- g~isft)x~ x Q tt
In order to see the equivalence between the existence of a utility maximizing con-
sumption btmdle for each agent aztd the fact that prices (p, q) are in the set P, we first
need some lemmas. It is clear that utility can be maximized as soon as the set
{:r E IR~}tl~ ~ 3z E Z' :(x,z) E B'(P,4,n)} ~
is compact. To see that this is equivalent to the compactness of B'(p,q,a) for prices
(p, q) in P, we need to study the relationship between x and z for (x, z) E B'(p, q, ~r).
This is what we do in lemma 4.1 and lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.1 : Let {(pn, qn) E P: n E 11V} be a seqnence convergáng to (p, q) E P, and
{~rn : n E IN} a sequence in IR, and let for each n E IN :(2n,zn) E Bi(pn qn ~n)
Suppose that assurnptions A3~,A32 and AQ are satisfied. Then
Ilz II ~~~ { Ilznll . n E 1N} is bounded,
n ~ 2
{~~xn~~ : n E 1N} --~ oo.
If p 1~ 0 and {n" : n E IN} is a bounded sequence, then
~~xn~~ ~ oo ~ ~~zn~~ ~ oo.10
Proof : Suppose that {~~z"~~ : n E 1N} ~ oo and suppose that the sequence




l~om the biidget constraints, it follows that for all s E{1, 2, ..., S} we have :
P~
(xs ~ws) - (A zn )~.
II4 II IIZ I)
Since limn~~ ~~z"~~ -~oo, we know that limn-.~ ~~ - y E AS(i)`{0}. This implies
that therc exists y E AS(i), y ~ 0 satisfying Ay - 0, which is in contradiction to
assumptiou A,~. Therefore, we know that the sequence {~-~ : n E IN} is boiinded.
Now it is clear that this also implies that {~~x"~~ : n E IN} ~ oo.
If p 1~ 0 and {rr" : n E IN} is a bounded sequence, then it follows from the budget
constraints that
~~x"~~ -~ oo ~ ~~z"~~ ~ oo.
Letnma 4.2 : Let {(p",q") E P: n E IN} be a sequence converging to (p,q) E P,
and {a~" : n E IN} a bounded sequence in IR. Suppose that the sequence {(x", z") E
Bi(pn qn ,~n) : n E~]} SatiSfiC3
llm ~~(x",z")~~ - ~-oo.
n~oo
Suppose furthermore that assumptions A3i,A32 andA4 are satisfied. Then the sequence
{~„ : n E IN} is bounded, ~~z"~~ ~ oo and ~~x"~~ -~ oo.
Proof : Since p 1~ 0 and {r:" : n E IN} is bounded, we know by lemma 4.1 that
~~z" ~~-~ oo. Then lemma 4.1 gives the desired result.
Lemma 4.3 : Lc.t {(p",q") E P: n E IN} 6c a sequerzr.e convergting to (p,q) E P. Let
{~" : n E IN} 6e a bounded sequence in IR. Suppose thnt assumptions A3i,A32 and A4
arr. ..atiafir.d. Thr.n for r.ach i E{1,2,...,I}, thr. act U B'(p",q",~") is boundcd.
nEN
Proof : Suppose that there exists an i E{ 1,2, .. ., I} such that the set U Bi(p", qn ,~n)
nEN
is not bounded. Then there is a sequence {mn E IN : n E 1N} such that for each n E IN,11
there exists (xn,zn) satisfyíng (xn,zn) E B'(pm~,qn`",,~n`") and limnti~ ~~(xn,zn)~~ -
too.
Then, since limn.y~ pn - p~~ O, it follows from lemma 4.2 that :
~~xnl~ ~ ~i
and ~~z"~~ --~ oo,
and { Ilxnll . n E 1N} is bounded.
Therefore, there exists a subsequence such that limn-.~ ~i - y E AS(i). Then it
follows from the budget constraints that
li~PÓ Ilxnll C ly~ 1 Pó
~~xn~~ - qn ~~xn~~ - Clqnl ~~xn~~ } V~ ~~xn~~~ ~
n ` i n x w z
ly~pa Ilxnll - ly~ ~pa Ilxnll } Allxttll
Therefore, by taking limits for`ra -~ oo, anrl since p)] 0, it follows that there exists
y E AS(i) satisfying :
C-9y - c~q~~y~l E IRS}~ `{0}.
Ay l t
This is a contradiction to the fact that q E Q.
We immediately have the following comllary :
Corollary 4.1 : Let (p,q) be a price vector in P, and n E IR. Suppose that assum,ptions
A31, A32 and A4 are satisfied. Then for each i E{1, 2, ... , I}, the budget sef B`(p, q, a)
is bounded.
Proof : T~ivial consequence of lemma 4.3.
In the following proposition we show that each agent i E{ 1, 2, ..., I} will be able to
maximize his utility over his budget set B'(p, q, ~r) if and only if the spot prices and the
asset prices (p, q) are in the set P.
Proposition 4.1 : Suppose that assumptions A~,A31iA32 and A9 are satisfied . Then
for every ~r ~ 0, the following statements are equivalent :
i) bi E{1,2,...,I} : B'(p,q,n) is compact,
ii) (p,q) E P,
iii) `di E {1,2,...,I} : argmax u'(x) ~ 0.
(x,r)EB~(y,p,x)12
Proof : It is clear that budget sets are closed. Therefore, ii) ~ i) follows directly
from corollary 4.1.
i) ~ iii) is trivial since it is clear that for (p,q) E P, and a ~ 0, the budget set
B'(p,q,~r) is non-empty, since (w',0) E B`(p,q,a).
iii) ~ ii) : suppose that (p, q) ~ P. Then either there exists (s, l) E{0, 1, ..., S} x
{1, 2, ..., L} such that p,,~ L 0, and then clearly agents will not be able to maximize
their utility, or there exists an agent i E{1, 2, ... , I} and a portfolio z E AS(i) such
that C-qz - c1411z1~ E 1Rft' i{0}.
Az
Now let (á, z) E B`(p, q, ~r), and i E argmax(:.,s)EB~(y,y,x) u'(x). Since z E AS(i), i E Z',
it ir wi~ll ku~iwu thxt ~{ z E Z'. Thi~n rousidor the sct of thcxw~ :r E X', tiatisfying :
Poxo C Powó - 4(z f z) - c1911? -F zl f v;a
(Px')i - (Pw')i f A(z -} z),
i.e., (t, z~ z) E B`(p, q, x). Now since ~-9~ Áz9~~`~~ E IR~}1 `{0}, it follows that
q(i} z) - ~Iqllz f zl ~-qZ - ~IsllZl } -qz - ~Isllzl
(- A(z f z) )-( Az ) Az
9z ~I911z1
~ (- - Az
This implies that there exists an (x, z f á) satisfying :
r(x, á~- z) E B'(P, q,x),
(lx~'i,
which is clearly a contradiction to the fact that (i, z) E f'(p, q, x).
Proposition 4.1 implies that demand and excess demand relations are correspon-
dences, i.e. their values are non-empty, on the set P x IRt. Since we can use Walras'
law it is clear that, if we want to prove existence of equilibria (and are not necessarily
concerned with the multiplicity of the equilibria), we can intmduce S-f- 1 price normal-
izations, i.e. one for each state s E{0,1, ..., S}. Therefore, we define the "normalized"
price set as being the set of those prices in P for which the price of good one equals 1
in each state s E{0,1, ..., S}. This yields the following definition :13
Deflnition 4.3 : The normalized price aet ie defined by :
~:- {(p, q) E P ~ b~s E{0, 1, ... , S} : p,~ - 1}.
In the next proposition, we will study the properties of the demand and excess
demand correspondences on the normalized price set ~.
Proposition 4.2 : Under a.~aumption.~ A, we have :
I) B'(p, q, ~r) ia a non-empty, cloaed and convea aubaet ofX' x Z' for every vector
(P,9,7)EPxLRt.
S~ f'(p, q, ~r) ia a non-empty, convez, compact aubaet of X` x Z' for every vector
(P, 4, ~) E P x IRt.
9) f`(p, q, a) ha~ a clo~ed graph on P x IR~, and u upper hemi eontinuow on
PxIRt.
4) Let {(P",9") : n E IN} C ~, and {ir" : n E IN} C IRt. If
i) limnyoo ~~P"~~ - f~
or ii) lim"~~(p", q") -(p,q) E P`P and {~r" : n E IN} C IRf ia bounded
or tiiJ 11mn~~ ~I4"I~ - ~oo
or iv) limny~ n" --Foo and {(p", q") : n E IN} óounded,
then al! aequencea {y" : n E 1N} for which for each n E IN there exuts a portfolio
z" E IRJ zuch that (yn,Zn) E F,(pn qn ,~n) are auch that the aet
{~S ~~ " n E IN} ia unbounded above. e-0 f-1 ya,l '
Proof :
1) It is clear that for each vector (p, q, ~) E P x 1Rf, the budget set B'(p, q, ~)
is non-empty and closed. Now suppose that (x, z) E B'(p, q, a) and (y, v) E
B'(p, q, a). Then
poxu G Powp - qz - c~4~~z~ f v~~~
Poyo C Powó - 9v - c~4~~v~ f v'a,
(Px)i - (Pw~)i -f Az,
(Py)i - (Pw~)i f Av.
Therefore, it follows that for all t E[0,1], we have
pn(txo f(1 - t)yo) C t~Powó - 9z - c~R~~z~ t v~n) f(1 - t) ~Powó - qv - c~4~~v~ f ~~n)
G powó - q(tz f(1 - t)v) - c~4~~tz ~(1 - t)v~ ~ v'n
(P(tx f (1 - t)y))i - (Pw')i ~ A(tz f (1 - t)v).14
So clearly
(tx f(1 - t)y,tz -~ (1 - t)v) E B`(p,q,a).
Therefore, budget sets aze convex.
2),3) The proof of 2) and 3) goes along the usual lines if one keeps in mind the price
normalization, the assumptions A, and the results of lemma 4.1, lemma 4.2,
and lemma 4.3, and proposition 4.1.
4) It is cleaz that, since consumption sets are bounded from below, it is sufficient
to prove that there exists an agent i E{1,2,...,I} such that all sequences
{x" : n E IN} for which for each n E W there exists a portfolio z" E IR~ such
that (xn zn) E fi(pn qn .~n) aze such that the Sequence {~~x"~~ : n E IN} is
unbounded above.
4i) We consider the case where there exists a state s E{0,1, ..., S} and a good
1 E{2, 3, . .., L} such that lim"~~ p;,l - f~.
Let i E{1, 2, ..., I} be azbitrary but fixed. Suppose that there exists a sequence
{(xn zn) E fi(pn qn ,~n) : n E IN} such that the sequence {~~x"~~ : n E lN} is
bounded. Then there is a convergent subsequence {x"~ : k E IN} ~ x.
~ Suppose that x,,~ ~ 0. Then we define a new sequence as follows :
k n~ 1
y,,l .- x,,~ - nw
Pe,(
k n~ 1
~i,,1 :- x,,l f i~~
P,,i
yéo~-xév forallt~s,vE{1,2,...,L}
s,v :- x;;, for all v E {2,3,...,L} `{1}.
Clearly pákyá - p~~ xs ~ for all k E 1N and for all s E{0,1, .. ., S}. Therefore,
since x,,~ ~ 0, there exists ko E IN such that yk 1 0 and therefore (yk, z"' ) E
B'(p"k , q"k , 7f"w ) for all k~ ko. This implies that for all k 1 ko we have
yk -{' x"k. Therefore also limk~~ yk ~' x. This is a contradiction since by
monotonicity of the preferences, by definition of {yk : k E IN}, and since
p;~- 1 we know that limk...~ yk ~` x.
~ Suppose that x,,~ - 0. Then we define for each t E]0,1] the sequencc
y`'k :- (1 - t)yk -~ tw'.
Then for each t E]0,1], there exists ki E lN such that for all k~ ki we have
y`~k ~ 0. Since (yk, z"' ) and (w', 0) are in B'(p"' , q"i , 7f"w ) for all k) ki, it15
follows that (y~~k, (1 - t)z"' ) E Bi(p"k, q"w, ~"k ) for all k~ k!. So for each
t E]0, 1] we must have limk-.~ y~~k - y! ~i limky~ x"' - x, and therefore
limiyo y! ~i x. This is a contradiction, since clearly limi-.o y! 1 x.
4ii) Suppose that lim"~~(p",q") - (p,q) E~`~, and there is a subsequence
such that lim"~~ a" - ~r. By proposition 4.1, we know that there is an agent
i E{1, 2, . .., I} satisfying f'(p, q, ~r) -~. Suppose now that there e~àsts a
sequence {(xn,zn) E fi(pn qn ,~n) : n E IN} such that {x" : n E IN} 1s a
bounded sequence. By lemma 4.1, we know that {z" : n E IN} is also a bounded
sequence. Therefore, tliere exists a convergent subsequence limk-.~(x"', z"' )-
(x, z). Then the contradiction follows from the the fact that f i has a cloaed
graph on ~ x IR~ and the fact that f i(p, q, a) -~.
4iii) Suppose that limn~~ II9"II -~. Suppose for instance that there is an asset j
with limn-.~ q~ - -1-00.
Then, by assumption AZ and assumptions Aa we know that there exists an e) 0,
and an agent i E{1, 2, ..., I} such that z--el~ E Z'. Since Zi is convex and
0 E Zi, we can always choose e small enough such that also w~ , f(Az), ~ 0
for all s E{1, 2, ..., S}. Then we define the following consumption bundles
Jó,i - Pówó - Qn- - cI9~~IIZI -F vi,~n
yó,! - 0 b'1 ~ 2
ya,l - Paws ~ (AZ)a
yá,l-0 t11~2.
Clearly, there is a subsequence such that q"z t cI4"IIzI - -e(i - c)q~ for all
n. Therefore, since c G 1, (y", z) E Bi(p", Q", ~"), and lim"-.~ yó,l - f~.
Suppose that there exists a sequence {(x",z") E fi(pn qn ~n) : n E IN} such
that the sequence {x" : n E IN} is bounded. Then consider the consumption
bundles
U" - ny" ~- (1 - ~)x".
yo,i yo,i
Clearly (v", yaz-{-(1- ~ó )zn) E Bi(pn qn ~n) Therefore for each n E IN we
know that v" ~i x". But taking limits for n~ oo, this yields a contradiction.
The proof in the case where there exists j E{1, 2, ..., J} such that
lim"~~ Q~ - -oo is analogous.
4iv) Finally, suppose that {(p",q") : n E 1N} is bounded and limn.y~~r" - foo.
Since ~~! v; - 1, we know that there is at least one agent i E{1, 2, . .., I}16
who has a strictly positive share in the broker, i.e. v; 1 0. Then it follows from
the budget constraints that for a sequence {(x",zn) E fi(p" qn'~n) : Ti E jn1}
it nntst be the case that lim"-.~ ~~(x",z")~~ - foo. Now we know that there
exists a convergent aubsequence (p"',q"') -~ (p,q) E P. Therefore, applying
lemma 4.1 yields that the sequence {x" : n E IN} is unbotmded since it has a
subsequence converging to .}oo.
5. Existence of equilibria
We will use Kakutani's fixed point theorem to prove existence of equilibria. Therefore,
we first construct a compact subset of the price set P such that equilibrium prices cannot
be on the botmdary of this set.
Lemma 5.1 : If asaumptiona A3i,A32 and A4 are satufied, then Q ie an open aubaet
of IR~. F'urthermore Q~{q E IRJ ~ 3~ E IRt.~ : q- trA} .
Proof: Suppose that {q" : n E IN} is a sequence in IR~`Q. Then it is clear that for each
n E 1N, there exists a portfolio z" E U;-~AS(i) `{o}, such that -qz" - c~9~~z"~ ~ 0,
and Az" 1 0, with at least one strict inequality (by assumption A4, Ay - 0 and
y E U; ~AS(i) implies that y- 0. Therefore, all arbitrage possibilities y E U;~AS(i)
are such that Ay 1 0). Since z" ~ 0, and by definition of AS(i), this implies that
- q~~z"~~ - c~9~ I~z;,~~ ? ~~
Allznll ? 0,
Ilz"II E U~-tAS(i} `{0}.
Now there exists a subsequence such that limk~~ sRk - y,limky~ z,,; - ~y~, and
- qy - c~4~~y~ ~ ~~
Ay~O.
By assumption A3~ and by definition of y, it follows that y E U;lAS(i) `{0}. Then it
follows from assumption A4 that Ay ~ 0. So, we can conclude that q~ Q. Therefore,
it follows that Q is open.
It is well known that
{qElRJ~3nE1R~t:4-trA}-{qE1Rf ~~izEIR~:~Az~~1Rf}t`{0}}.17
Therefore, it is clear that
Q~ {qE1R~ ~ 3aEIR~~:9-aA}.
It is cleaz that the normalized price set
~-{(R4)E~ff~)LxQlpa,~-1 ~dsE{0,1,...,5}},
is not an open set because of the normalization. Therefore, we introduce the following
notation :
Notation: ForeachmatrixpElR(s}~)x~wedenotep~Iforthematrixin~(sfi)x(t-i)
containing pa,i, s E{0,1, .. ., S},1 E {2, 3, .. , L}.
For each matrix p- (p,~~,(s,l) E {0,1,...,5} x{2,3,...,L}) E IR(sf~)x(~-~) we
denote p~~ for the matrix in IR(s}~)x~ with p,,i - 1 for all states s E{0,1, ... , S}.
For a subset C of 1R(s}~)(~-~), we denote
Ct~ :- {p~~ ~ p E C}.
In order to be able to prove existence of equilibria by means of Kakutani's fixed
point theorem, we need to compactify the price set in such a way that we know for sure
that equilibrium prices have to be in the interior of this compact subset of prices. To
construct this compact set, we need a lemma.
Lemma 5.2 : Let K be a campact subset of the set Q. Let q be a vector in Q. Then
there exists a compact subset C of Q such that :
i~ q E int(C),
ii) K C int(C).
Proof : Trivial consequence of lenuna 5.1.
For teclmical reasons, we define a special price vector as follows :
Deflnition 5.1 : The price vector (p`,q) E P is defined as follows :
p,,~ - 1 ds E{0,1,...,S},l E{1,2,...,L},
s
9j - ~Aaj bj E {1,2,...,.Í}.
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C'Ic,arly, ~~ ~ 7 0. Furthennore, q- ~rA with a-(1,1, . ..,1) 11 0. Therefore, it
fullows from lemma 5.1 that q E Q. So cleazly (p,q) E T.
In the following lemma we construct compact price sets Cp for spot prices and Cy for
asset prices, and an interval for the broker's profit ~ such that we know that equilibrium
prices ancl profits cannot be on the boundary of these sets.
Lemma 5.3 : There is a non-empty ~ubeet Cp of IR~f ~1~L-1~, a non-empty eubaet Cy
of Q, and a re,al number lí ~ 0, ~uch that C- CP x Cy ia compact, and
1) for al[q E óCy U(Q `Cy), p E IR~t ~IL, n~ 0, we have
S L
(y, ~) E F(P, 9, ~) ~~~ y'~! ~ ~'
s-0 !-1
2) for all p E riCy U(IRtt ~~L `Cy),~r 1 O,q E Q, we have
s [ L~
(tJ,z) E F(Pi.l,4,~) ~~ Lya,l 1 0,
a-0 !-1
3) for all ~r ~ lí,p E IR~~~~L,q E Q, we have
S L
(y, ~) E F(P, 4, ~) ~ ~ ~ ya~! ~ ~'
a-0 1-1
4) (p~~,q) E int(Cy) x int(Cy).
Proof :
1) We defuie the following set
S L
3~r E IRf,P E ~ff ~IL : 3(y,~) E F(P,9,~) - ~~y'~l C 0 .
a-o ícl
Now suppose that {q" : n E IN} is a sequence in Ka. Then for all n E IN, there
exists a spot price matrix p" E IRf~ ~1L and a profit ~r" ~ 0 such that there exists a
vector (yn,Zn) E F(pn qn xn) satisfying -
s L
,~ C 0. ya,( -
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Thcn it follows from proposition 4.2 that :
{~~(p",q")~~ : n E IN} is a bounded sequence (4.2.i),iii)),
{a" : n E IN} is a bounded sequence (4.2.iv)),
if lim (p",q") -(p,q) then (p,q) r~ F(4.2.ii)),
nyoo
Therefore, it follows that there exists a price vector (p, q) E IRf f t)L x Q and a profit
a? 0 such that for a subsequence we have lim"~oo(pn qn ,~n) -(p q,~) E F x IRf.
By upper hemi continuity of the excesa demand correspondence F on ~, it follows
that there exists a vector (y, z) such that for a subsequence :
(y, z) - ~ly~(y"`, z"' ),
(y, z) E F(P, 4, x),
S L
Lr L. y'~r C 0.
s-0 1-1
Therefore, the price vector q is in K,. This implies that K, is a compact subset
of Q. Then by lemma 5.2, we know that there exists a compact set Cy such that
q E int(Cy) and K, C int(Cy).
Now q E 8Cy U (Q `Cy) implies q ~ K, and this implies, by definition of KQ, that
for all ~r ~ 0, p E IR~fr)L, and for all (y, z) E F(p, q, rr) we have :
s L
~ ~ ys~l i ~.
s-0 f-1
Therefore, the set Cy satisfies 1).
2) We now define the set :
K~ - 1p E ~}}f)(L-1)
s L
3~r 1 0, 4 E Q- 3(y, z) E F(Pfr, 4, x) :~ L. y"~r C 0 .
~-o r-f
As in 1), it can be shown that K, is compact. Then we construct a compact set
Cy C rR`f~ f)(L-1) such that p~~ E Cy and K, C int(Cy).




As in 1), we prove that K6 is a compact set. Now it is clear that
K- max{~r ~~r E K6 }~- 1,
gives the desired result.
4) is satisfied by construction.
To prove existence we pmceed in the traditional way, i.e. we use Kakutani's fixed
point theorem and show that this fixed point is an equilibrium. To be able to use
Kakutani's fixed point theorem however, we need a convex price set. Since Q will in
general (for c) 0) not be convex, we cannot simply take the convex hull of Cq to
get a convex subset of Q. If there would be azi argument that yields that (for assets
with positive payoff) excess demand is strictly positive as soon as an asset price q~ is
non-positive, we could restrict to the set
Qtt :- 4 E IR~ Vz E U~ AS i 9z - c9lz~ ~sti 0 tt ~ ~ ( ): - Az ~ t `{ }},
which is an open and convex subset of IR~.
But, even in the case where asset returns are non negative in each state, i.e. A~ E
IR~ `{0} for each j E{ 1,2, . .. , J}, we cannot in general exclude the possibility that
there is no excess demand of the asset if the price is zero. To prove this atatement, we
give an example of a market with portfolio constraints and no transaction costs (c - 0)
where assets pay off in positive amounts, and yet, the equilibrium price of one of the
assets is strictly negative.
Example : Negative equilibrium prices
We consider an economy with two agents, two assets, one good, two time periods,
and two possible states at date one. Spot prices are considered to be equal to one. Thc
matrix of asset returns A is given by
The trade set for agent one is given by Z~ - {(z~, zz) E 1R2 ~ zl ~ zz G 1}. The trade
set for agent two is given by Z~ -{(zi , zz ) E IR2 I zi C 1}.
There are no transaction costs (c - 0). The initial endowment for both agents is
equal to (wó, w~ , wz )-(4, 3, 3), i- 1, 2. The utility function of agent one equals u1(x)-21
xo ~ x~ -~a x2. The utility function of agent two equals u2(x) - b( xo ~ xl)-~ x2.
So budget sets aze given by :




We see quite easily that for a- f(2f ~), and 6 - f, q-(-1, 1) is an equilibrium
price vector with equilibrium allocations i~ -(1,2,5), and i2 -(7,4,1).
So asset 1 has a negative equilibrium price although its payoff is a positive vector.
The explanation of the possibility of a negative equilibrium price in this case is simple.
The price of contingent commodity one is strictly negative. Yet, agent one will not buy
as much as he is allowed to buy of this contingent commodity because every unit of
contingent commodity one that he buys implies that he is allowed to buy one unit of
contingent commodity two less, since z~ ~ z2 is bounded fmm above. Therefore, we
choose the utility function of agent one such that he prefers contingent commodity two
more than contingent conunodity one and date zero cousurnption. To compensate this,
we choose the utility function of agent two such that he prefers contingent commodity
two less than contingent commodity one and cíate zero consumption. This turns out to
lead to an eqtulibrium with a negative price for contingent commodity one.
This example clearly shows that, even in the case where a.sset returns are positive,
we cannot a priori say that equilibrium prices will be strictly positive. This will depend
on the structure of the trade sets Zi, i E{1, 2, ..., I}. This implies that we cannot solve
the problem of the non-convexity of the set Q by restricting to positive prices q E Off,
even if we restrict to asset stnictures A E IRtx~.
Therefor~~, we compactífy the economy such that in the new economy, demand and
excess deiu~url are well ~ie,fiu,,cl and tt.h.c. on the set
~:- {(P,4,n) E IlZlsti)L x IR~ x IRt ~ Ps,i - 1,9 E{0,1,...,5}},
and yield excess demand for each asset price on the boundary of the convex hull of the
set Cy. Then we can use Kakutani's fixed point theorem to pmve that this compactified
economy has an equilibriuin which is also an equilibrium for the original economy.
Deflnition 5.2 :
i) For each agent we defane the compact coneumption aet :
r I L S
X'-(xEX' x;tG~~~w,~fl .
l i-1 1-1 s-0E2
ii) For each agent we define the budget set :
B~(P, 9, ~) - (x, z) E X' x Z~ Poxo G Powó - qz - c~4~~z~ f v;a
~ (Px)i - (Pw~)i f Az }.





F(P, 9, ~) -~(f ~(P, q, n) -(w~, ~))-
t-t
Lemma 5.4 : Suppose that assumptions A are satisfied. Then
i) the budget sets B'(p, q, a), i E{ 1, 2, ..., I} are non-empty, compact and convex for
every (p, q, ~r) E P.
ii) the correspondences f', i E{1, 2, .. ., I} and F are upper hemi confinuous on P.
Proof : i) It is clear that (w', 0) E B`(p, q, ~r) for all i E{1, 2, ..., I}. So budget sets are
non-empty. Now suppose that {(x", z") : n E IN} C B'(p, q, ~). Then {x" : n E 1N}
is a bounded sequence and has a converging subsequence. Then it follows from lemma
4.1 that {z" : n E IN} is also bounded. So there exists a converging subsequence
{(x", z") : n E IN} ~(x, z), and clearly (x, z) E B`(p, q, n). Therefore B'(p, q, ~r) is
compact. The proof of the convexity goes as in proposition 4.2 1).
The proof of ii) goes along the usual lines.
Lemma 5.5 : There is a non-empty subset Cp of IR~f~)(L-~), a non-empty subset Cy




(y, z) E F(P, 4, ~) ~~~ y"~~ ~ ~'
s-0 1-1
2) for all p E aCp, ~r ~ 0, q E IR~, we have
S L
(y,z) E F(Pfl,q,n) ~ ~~y'~~ ~ ~'
a-0 I-123
8) for all a 1 K,p E Ift~t 1~L,q E IR~, we have
S L
(y, z) E F(P, 4, n) ~ ~~ p.,r ~ 0,
,-o i-t
4J (Pp,4) E int(Cp) x int(Cy).
Proof : Let Cy, Cy and K E~ be as constructed in lemma 5.3. Then we denote Cy
for the convex hull of CQ, and Cy for the convex hull of Cy.
1) Let q E óCy U Q`, p E IR~~ t)L, ~ ? 0 and suppose that there exists (x', z`) E
f'(p,q,?c) for each agent i E{1,2,.. ,I}, such that
S L J
~ ~ ~(xa,! - wa,l) C ~.
a-0 1-] i-1
Then by definition of X`, it must Ue the case that for all age.nts i E{ 1, 2, . .., I},
we have z; ~ G~~-t ~; o~jt w; t f 1 for s E{0, 1, .. , S},1 E {1, 2, .. , L}.
Therefore, the strong convexity of the utility fitnctions yields (xi, zi ) E f`(p, q, ~) for
all agents i E {1,2,...,I}.
But this is a contradiction because by lemma 5.3, if q E 8Cy U Q`, then either
q E 8Cy U (Q `Cy) and this would imply that ~; o~jt~~-t(x;,t - w; t) ~ 0, or
q~ Q ancl then there exists an agent such that fi(p, q, ~r) - 0.
2),3) If q~ Q, then 1) yields the desired result. Otherwise, we can again apply lemma 5.3.
4) ~ivial.
Theorem 5.2 : Under assumptions A, there exists a financial market equilibrium with
portfolio constraints and transaction costs, i.e. there exist prices and profit (p,q,ir) E
]R~~ t1L x IR~ x IR~ such that
iJ s' E azgmax(:,:)EB~(y,y,~u'(x) for all i E{1,2,...,I},
iiJ (x , z) E B'(p, q, ir) for all i E{1, 2, ... , I},
iiJ ~i-t x` - ~i-1 w`,
iiiJ ~;-t i - 0,
ivJ ir - c~it ~4~~z ~.
Proof : We define the following correspondence :
i
h(P, 4, x) -~(f`(P, 4, n) -(w`, ~)) -
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Let Cy, Cy and K be as constructed in lemma 5.5. We denote C- Cp x Cy. Since the
demand correspondences fi aze u.h.c. on Ctf, we know that there exists a compact,
convex set B such that h(Cfl x[0, KJ) C B. We defïne the correspondence




~C'~9')EC}, i-1 i-] i-1
where ((y, z)) denotes the vector ((yf , zi ), (y2, z2), . . . , (y~, z~)).
This is clearly a non-empty, convex valued correspondence which has a closed graph.
Therefore we know by Kakutani's fixed point theorem that there is a fixed point
(p, q, ((y, z)), ir). Cleazly, tlus fixed point satisfies :
I 1
and
(~ y`, ~ z`) E F(P, 4, ~),
i-] i-1
I ~
~(F,4) - (P,9)~(~y`,~z`)) C 0 `d(Rq) E Cti,
i-1 i-1
1
and ir - min{c~4~ ~ ~z ~, K}.
i-1
il~rthermore, it is straightforwazd to see that for (y, z) -(~~ 1 yi, ~~-~ zi) E F(p, q, n),
one has
[ S -~ L I
((R q) -(F, q)) (~J, z) ~ L~ ya,l f c~9~ ~ ~z`~ -~,
a-0 f-1 i-1
where (p,q) denotes the special vector defined in definition 5.1. Now suppose that
ir - K G c~q~ ~~-y ~z'~. Then by lemma 5.5 3), it follows that :
~(P,9) - (P,9)~(~
i-1
~ ~ s L
~~z')' LLLy,,f
i-1 i-1 ,-o f-1
~0.
Since (p,q) E Cfl, this is contradictory to the fixpoint conditions. Therefore, we know
that n- cq ~~-~ ~z`~. So it follows that
i s L i i
~~~ ys,f c~(P, 4) -(R 9))(~ y,~ z`) C 0.
i-1 s-o f-f i-t :-125
Therefore, by lemma 5.5 2) we know that p~t ~ r7Cy.
Now let (s, l) E{0,1, ..., S} x{2, 3, ..., L} be arbitrary but fixed. Since p~t is in
the interior of Co, we can choose F 1 0 small enough such that the vector (p, q) -
(p ~ el~,.t~,q) is again in the set Ctt. This leads to the conclusion that for each state
s E{0,1, ... , S} and for each l E {2, 3, .. ., L}, we have ~;-1 y, t C 0. Repeating this
same argument with -e instead of e gives us that for all states s E{0,1, ..., S}, and
for all ! E{2, 3, ..., L}, we have ~~-t y, t- 0.
Analogously, since
L~ ~ L~ ya,l C~(P~ 4) -(P, 9)J(~ y,~ z) G 0,
i-1 a-0 t-1 i-t i-1
it follows from lemma 5.5 1) that q~ BCy. Therefore we can find e~ 0 auch that for
each asset j E{1,2,...,J},the vectors (p,q) -(p,q f el~),j E{1,2,...,J} are again
in C~t. Therefore, we can conclude that ~~ t z~ - 0 for each asset j E{1,2,... , J}.
Introducing these conclusions into Walras' Law, we get
i
~ - c~4~ ~ ~z~ ~,
i-1
i
~ z - 0,
i-1
I
' - 0 y~,t s E {0,1,...,S},l E {2,3,...,L},
i-1
i
Po,t ~ yó,t ~ 0,
i-1
!
' -0 Ps,t ye,t s E {1,2, . ,S}.
i-1
Now since we know that p,,t - 1 for all s E{0,1, ..., S}, this implies that ~;-1 yo,t G 0
and ~i-1 y;,t - 0 for all s E{1, 2, ..., S}. Therefore, it follows that i; t :- y, t} w;,t C
~ao~~t~i-1 w; t f 1, for all s E{0,1, ..., S}, l E {1, 2, .. ., L}, and therefore :
i i
(~ y,~ á) E F(P, 9, ~).
i-1 i-126
This implies that the date aero budget constraint is satisfied in equality, so we can
conclude that :
I I
(~ y', ~ á) E F(P, 4, ~),
t-i ;-t
~ i
(~ y', ~ z') - (~, 0).
~-~ ~-~
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study a general equilibrium inodel for potentially incomplete fi-
nancial markets with two types of constraiuts on the trade : portfolio constraints and
transaction costs. We prove that equilibria exist uncler some rather general assumptions
on the mathematical structure of the trade sets of the agents. Ft~rthermore, we show
that there are essentially two types of arbitrage possibilities, from which only one of
these types is a priori incompatible with equilibrium. By giving an example, we show
that equilibritun prices exist which allow for tlie second type of arbitrage possibilities.
As mentioned before, the results in this paper ctui easily be generalized to the case
where :
i) there is more than one broker,
ii) there are different classes of assets, and each class hss it's own commission c.References
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